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Abstract 
In this paper, we develop a new model in marketable pollution permits that consists of 
perfectly competitive, multi-product, multi-pollutant firms. The formulation and qualitative 
analysis of the model, as well as the computational approach, are based on the theory of 
variational inequalities. 
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1. Introduction
The problem of environmental pollution results partly from the absence of prices 
of certain scarce environmental goods, such as clean air and water. Because there 
is no cost attached to the discharge of pollutants, and there is no incentive for the 
reduction of discharges, industrial firms emit an excessive amount of pollution that, 
in many cases, is more than can be absorbed by the environment. 
One economic approach to the pollution-reduction problem is to set up a market 
for pollution permits. In this approach, at least in theory, the pollution-emitters 
have a choice between reducing emissions by employing some abatement tech-
nology, or purchasing permits from other emitters that hold excess permits. The 
permits in such a market would be completely transferrable, so that the participat­
ing emitters could trade the permits, depending on their cost of control. As 
Tietenberg (1980) notes, this reallocation of permits can lead to substantial 
reductions in pollution, under competitive conditions, while ensuring that environ­
mental quality standards are met. 
An alternative approach to the pollution-reduction problem is to place an 
appropriate price on the polluting firms. It turns out that the corrective price takes 
the form of a Pigouvian tax (Pigou, 1920), which, if set equal to the marginal 
external cost, will induce the polluting firm to internalize the full social costs of its 
contribution to the pollution damage (Baumol and Oates, 1988). Yet another 
approach, i.e. that of unit subsidies, is equivalent to the tax approach, in that it can 
establish the same incentive for abatement as would a tax of an identical magni­
tude. However, these two approaches have different implications for the profitabil­
ity of production in the polluting industry and the long-run entry-exit decisions 
(Cropper and Oates, 1992). 
In this paper, we develop a general market model in pollution permits, in which 
individual firms will minimize costs, while ensuring that the externally set environ­
mental quality standards are met. The individual firms produce multiple products 
and emit multiple pollutants. We assume that the firms are perfectly competitive in 
their output markets, as well as in the permit markets. Because we are analyzing 
firm behavior at large, each source of pollution takes the price of its output and the 
pollutant-specific permit as given, because it is assumed that each source in a 
region is small relative to the entire economy. The model deals explicitly with 
spatial differentiation, through the use of a diffusion matrix that maps emissions 
from sources to receptor points that are dispersed in space. This is especially 
important because studies show that, for certain pollutants, if spatial differentia­
tion is not built into the system, then the cost-savings from employing an 
economic-incentive-based approach will be lost (Mendelsohn, 1986). 
The marketable pollution permit approach is selected for analysis in this paper, 
for a variety of reasons. The primary reason is that the regulatory body then has 
direct control over the quantity of emissions in the region, because it has the 
authority to issue pollution permits equal to the efficient quantity of pollution. The 
permit approach also enjoys the advantage of familiarity, because it is a modified 
form of the current regulatory approach. The strongest motive for marketable 
pollution permits, however, is that it provides an incentive for polluters to adopt 
new abatement and control technologies to reduce the level of emissions, because 
the excess number can be sold in the form of marketable assets. 
The methodology that we utilize for the formulation, qualitative analysis and 
computation of the equilibrium pattern in markets for pollution control is the 
theory of variational inequalities. The theory of variational inequalities has already 
been utilized to study a plethora of equilibrium problems in economics and 
operations research (Nagurney, 1993). In particular, it has been used recently to 
study equilibrium problems with policy interventions in the setting of spatial 
economic markets (Nagurney and Zhao, 1991; Nagurney et al., 1995, 1996) and in 
financial markets (Dong, 1995; Nagurney and Dong, 1995). The framework devel-
oped in this paper yields the profit-maximized quantities of the multiple products; 
the equilibrium quantities of the various emissions; the equilibrium allocation of 
pollution licenses; and the prices of the licenses. The use of variational inequality 
theory in environmental economics has yet to be fully explored. Here, we aim to 
make a contribution in this direction. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we consider the behavior of the 
individual firm and develop the optimization problem faced by the firm. Subse­
quently, we present the economic conditions that govern the market model and 
then derive the variational inequality formulation of the equilibrium conditions. 
We also establish that the equilibrium pattern does satisfy environmental quality 
standards imposed by the government, provided that the sum of licenses for each 
pollutant for a receptor point is equal to the imposed standard for that point. 
Furthermore, the equilibrium allocation of licenses is independent of the initial 
allocation of licenses, provided that the sums are satisfied. These are important 
features from an operational standpoint. In addition, we provide some qualitative 
properties of the equilibrium pattern. 
In Section 3, an algorithm is proposed for the computation of equilibrium, 
accompanied by the conditions for convergence. The algorithm - a modified 
projection method - is then applied to compute solutions to several numerical 
examples in Section 4. Finally, we summarize our results and present the conclu­
sions in Section 5. 
2. The model
In this section, we develop a multi-product, multi-pollutant market model in 
pollution permits that yields the profit-maximizing quantities of firms' products, the 
efficient quantities of emissions, and the equilibrium allocation of pollution licen­
ses, in addition to the prices of the licenses. 
We consider m sources of industrial pollution, which are firms that are fixed in 
location, with a typical source denoted by i. There are n receptor points, with a 
typical receptor point denoted by j. We assume that, in general, the firms and the 
receptor point are spatially separated. Let there be r different pollutants emitted 
by the sources, with a typical pollutant denoted by t. Each source produces a vector 
of emissions denoted by e;, where e; = (eJ, ... , ef, ... , e;) and where the compo­
nent e! denotes the amount of pollutant t emitted by source i. We further group 
the vectors {e 1, ••• , em} into the vector e ER":.� 
We assume, as given, an m x n X r diffusion matrix H, where the component 
h\j denotes the contribution that one unit of emission by source i makes to the
average pollutant concentration of type t at receptor point j. This idea comes from 
Montgomery (1972), who stated that the emission vector e; can be mapped into 
concentrations by the diffusion matrix H so that the resultant emissions will not 
exceed the externally set standard. 
Let a permit denote a license, the possession of which will allow a source to emit 
a specific pollutant at some specific receptor point. Hence, each polluter will have 
to hold a portfolio of licenses to cover all the relevant monitored receptor points. 
Let If i denote the number of licenses for pollutant t at point j held by source i,
and let us group licenses for each firm i into a vector I; E R!� We then further 
group the vectors {/ 1 , • • •  , Im} into the vector IE R";.
n '. We assume throughout that 
. 
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1 t 1 some m1 ia a oca 10n o 1censes, 1.e. ij; i = , ... , m; J = , ... , n; = , .. . , r,
has been made by the regulatory government authority. 
Furthermore, let p] denote the price of the license for pollutant t that affects 
receptor point j, and let us group the prices into the vector p E R'!7". Also, assume 
that the market in pollution licenses is perfectly competitive, i.e. each source of 
pollution takes the price of the license to pollute at a specific point as given and 
cannot affect the price itself, because each source is small relative to the entire 
economy. 
We also assume that the sources are perfectly competitive in their input and 
output markets. Let there be o different outputs produced by the sources, with a 
typical output denoted by k. Each of the sources produces a vector of products 
denoted by q;, where qi = (q;1, ... , qik • ... , q;) and where qik is the quantity of 
product k produced by source i. We group the vectors {q i , ... , qm} into the vector 
q E R";.0• Also, let 1Tk denote the price of the product which is assumed to be taken 
by a typical firm.
We further assume that the firms exhibit profit-maximizing behavior. To de­
scribe mathematically the behavior of the firms in the market, we first discuss the 
cost function faced by a typical firm and, subsequently, we define a market 
equilibrium relative to an initial allocation of licenses. Next, we derive the variatio­
nal inequality formulation of the governing equilibrium conditions, the solution to 
which yields the efficient quantities of product, emissions and licenses along with 
the license prices. 
2.1. The cost function 
To maximize profit, a competitive firm needs to minimize the cost of producing 
its optimal level of output. The cost function measures the minimum cost of 
producing some level of output, given fixed factor prices. Following the treatment 
by Henderson and Quandt (1980), we derive the cost function from the information 
on the production functions, the cost expression and the expansion path function. 
A production function is an equation or a schedule that shows the maximum 
amount of output that can be produced from any specified set of inputs, given the 
existing technology. In our case, the production function for the product qik 
depends on the employment of firm i's resources to the production of qi vector. 
Assume that a firm employs v types of input, with a typical input denoted bys. Let 
xi, denote the input that firm i employs in its production activity and let 'IJI/ 
denote the transformation function of inputs into outputs. Hence, it follows that 
k = 1, ... , 0. (1) 
For each pollutant t, the emissions function, in tum, depends on the employ­
ment of firm i's resources to the abatement activity for the vector ei and on the 
vector qi. We include the vector qi because the emissions of a firm are directly 
related to the production activity. Let T/ denote the transformation function of the 
inputs and the output into the emissions. Therefore, we may write 
t = 1, ... , r. 
Let the total cost of production G; be given by 
V 
G; = E W;sxi, + b s= l 
(2) 
(3) 
where W;5 denotes the price of input X;.,, and b denotes the cost of any fixed inputs. 
If the production function is strictly quasi-concave, then every point of tangency 
between an isoquant and an isocost line is the solution of both a constrained-maxi­
mum problem and a constrained-minimum problem. The locus of all the tangency 
points gives us the expansion path for the firm. A rational, profit-maximizing firm 
will select only input combinations that lie on its expansion path. 
Formally, this path is an implicit function of the inputs that can be expressed as 
(4) 
Assume that the systems of equations given by Eqs. (1)-(4) can be reduced to a 
single equation in which cost is stated as an explicit function of the level of output 
of products and emissions, and the input prices plus the fixed cost of inputs, i.e. 
V 
G; = L <l>;(e;, q;, W;5) + b.
s = I 
(5) 
This cost function cl>; is non-decreasing, homogeneous of degree one, and 
concave with respect to the input prices w;.,· We can assume that the input prices 
are invariant, so that the cost function depends on the emissions and output level, 
plus the fixed cost of inputs. Furthermore, this fixed cost of fixed inputs b must be 
paid by the firm i, regardless of whether or not it engages in production. Hence, 
the cost function takes the general form 
(6) 
2. 2. A firm's optimization problem
We now construct a constrained optimization problem in which a typical firm has
to take into account the joint cost of production and emissions abatement, as well 
as the cost of purchasing pollution licenses. 
Because the price of the product qik is 1rk, each firm i acquires a revenue of 
(7)
In addition, the value of a firm's initial endowment of licenses can be expressed 
as 
n r 
E E PJ*1:y 
j = 1 t = 1 
where pf* denotes the given price of a license to pollute a specific pollutant t at 
receptor point j, which, under the assumption of perfect competition in the license 
markets, is assumed as given. 
Also, the net cost of purchasing licenses for a specific pollutant t at all the 
receptor points is given by 
n 
� p t*(/1. -110 )i.J J I) I] " 
j = 1 
Consequently, the total net cost of purchasing licenses to cover all the emitted 
pollutants is given by 
r n 
� � p l* (11. - 110 )i.J i.J J I) I] " 
t = I j = I 
(8) 
We assume that each firm in the market is profit maximizing, so that it can be 
characterized by a utility function that measures its profit or net revenue. Hence, 
the utility function U; that faces each such firm i; i = 1, ... , m, can be expressed as the difference between the total revenue acquired by a firm and the total cost 
incurred by the firm. We have 
o n r 
U; = u;(q;, e;, l;) = L rrkqik - G;(e;, q;) - L L pj* (l!j - 1:n.
k=I j=lt=I 
A firm's optimization problem can be then expressed as 
subject to 
j = 1, ... ,n, t = l, ... ,r
and the non-negativity constraints 
k = 1, ... , o, t = 1, ... , r.
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
Eq. (11) states that each firm is allowed to have an average rate of emission for 
pollutant t that produces no more pollution at any point than the amount which 
the firm is licensed to cause at that point. 
We let A:i denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with the jtth constraint ofEq. (11), and we group these multipliers into the vector A; E R:� We note that Aji 
may be interpreted as the marginal cost of pollution abatement for pollutant t associated with firm i and receptor point j; we now term this Lagrange multiplier as the marginal abatement cost. The utility function for each perfectly competitive firm is concave with respect to licenses. Assuming that the utility function u;(q;, e;, l) is continuously differen­tiable and concave with respect to e; and q;, the necessary and sufficient conditions for an optimal product-specific output and pollutant-specific emissions, license and marginal abatement cost pattern (q'(, e'(, l;, A�) is that this pattern is non-negative and satisfies the inequality ;. [ aG;(e;, q;) _ l _ * � [ aG/e'(, q'() n l i.., a 1rk (qik qik) + i.., a 1 + L A:jh:i k= 1 qik 1= 1 e; j= 1 
n r X (ef - ef*) + L L (pJ* - A:j) (lfi - lfj)
n r 
j= It= 1 
+
E E ( lfj - h:ief* ) ( A:i - A:j) � 0j= I I= I Vq;k � 0, ef � 0, Lt � 0, ,\:i � O; j = 1, ... , n, k = 1, ... , o, t = 1, ... , r.
(13) Note that, in equilibrium, a similar inequality needs to hold for each of the other perfectly competitive firms. We now give a further interpretation to Eq. (13) in terms of equilibrium conditions. Our goal here is to provide an economic interpretation to the optimal­ity condition of Eq. (13). In particular, the first term in Eq. (13) describes the following equilibrium condition. For each product k, k = 1, ... , o, we have 
(
=
0 
� o: 
of qik > 0 if qik = 0. (14) This condition states that, when a positive quantity of output is produced by a firm, the principle of price equals marginal cost holds. However, if the marginal cost of production is greater than the price charged for the output, then it does not benefit the firm to produce and, consequently, qik = 0. The second term in Eq. (13) describes the following equilibrium condition. For each pollutant t, t = 1, ... , r, we have if ef* > 0 if ef* = 0. (15) Recall that A:i is the Lagrange multiplier attached to the corresponding emis­sions constraint, and can be viewed as the marginal abatement cost to be borne by firm i. The term A:ih:i is the shadow price times the ambient concentration for pollutant t at receptor point j, and can be interpreted as the shadow 
value to firm i of emissions constraint on ambient concentrations of pollutant t at receptor point j. Also aG;(e;, q; )/ ae: is the marginal cost of reducing emissions borne by firm i. Hence, the typical firm will only emit if this marginal cost equals minus the marginal abatement cost. However, if the marginal cost of reducing emissions is greater than minus the marginal abatement cost by the firm to reduce emissions, then it will be infeasible for the firm to emit any pollutants, hence, e!* will be zero. Likewise, the third term in Eq. (13) describes the following equilibrium condi­tion. For each receptor point j, j = 1, ... , n, and for each pollutant t, t = 1, ... , r,we have 
(pf* - A\j) f = 0, \ � 0, 
ifl1*>0 I) 
if 1:; = 0. (16) 
In other words, the final distribution of licenses will be positive only when the marginal abatement cost of pollution borne ( Alj) by source i for pollutant t that affects receptor point j is equal to the price of the specific pollutant license associated with the receptor point j, i.e. pf*. However, when the actual price of the license is greater than the marginal abatement cost, the final distribution of that license is zero. Finally, the fourth term in Eq. (13) describes the following equilibrium condition. For each receptor point j, j = 1, ... , n, and for each pollutant t, t = 1, ... , r, we have 
(ht .et* _ II*) f = O,I) I I) 
\ � 0, 
if ,\1* > 0 I) 
if A\j = 0. (17) 
This system has the following interpretation. When the em1ss1ons constraint is binding, the shadow price A\j associated with the constraint reflects this fact, by taking on a positive value. However, when the constraint is non-binding, the shadow price associated with the constraint is driven to zero. We now describe the system of equalities and inequalities that govern the quantities and prices of the licenses in the region at equilibrium. Mathematically, the economic system conditions that govern market clearance in pollution permits are as follows. For each receptor point j, j = 1, ... , n, and for each pollutant t,
t = 1, ... , r, we have 
m 
� (110 - 11*) i..., I) I) 
i= I 
if pJ* > 0 
if pJ* = 0. (18) 
This system states that, if the price of a license for pollutant t at a point j is positive, then the market for licenses at that point must clear; if there is an excess supply of licenses for a particular pollutant t at a receptor point, then the price of a license at that point must be zero. 
We now define an equilibrium by combining the optimality conditions for each 
firm and the market clearing conditions for the pollution permits. 
Definition (an equilibrium). A vector (q* ,e*, I*, A*, p*) E R";_ 0 +mr+2m11r+11r is an 
equilibrium point of the market model for pollution permits developed above if and only 
if it satisfies Eq. (13) for all firms i, and the system of equalities and inequalities of Eq. 
(18) for all receptor points j = 1, ... , n, and for all pollutants t = 1, ... , r.
2.3. Variational inequality formulation 
We now derive the variational inequality formulation of the equilibrium condi­
tions of Eq. (13) and (18) that govern the above multi-product, multi-pollutant 
market model. The variational inequality problem is a unified framework within 
which all the above inequalities and equalities can be expressed as a single 
inequality. As mentioned in the Introduction, this framework has already been 
used to formulate a plethora of equilibrium problems that arise in economics and 
operations research (Nagurney, 1993). However, its potential in environmental 
economics has yet to be fully explored. 
Theorem 1 (variational inequality formulation). A vector of firm production outputs, 
emissions, licenses and associated marginal abatement costs, along with the vector of 
permit prices, i.e. 
(q*, e*, /*,A*, p*) E Rmo+m
r+2m11r+11r 
is an equilibrium point if and only if it satisfies the variational inequality problem, i.e. 
m a 
[ 
aG.(e* q*) 
l E E 'a' ' ' - 1rk (qik -qt)i=l k=l qik 
m r 
[ 
aG.(e* q*) n 
l 
l l ' I f* t t l* 
+ E E 1 + E A;i h;i (e; - e; ) 
i=l /=] ae; j=l 
m n r 
+ E E E ( pJ* - A\j) (it - 1:j)
i= 1 j= It= 1
m n r 
+ E E E (l:j - h\ie/*) ( A\i -A'.j)
i= 1 j= 1 t= 1 
n r m 
+ E E E (l:Y -1;j)(PJ - pJ*) � o,
j= 1 t= 1 i= I 
't/(q, e,l ,  A, p) E R";.o+mr+2m11r+11r 
Proof. See Appendix A. 
(19) 
We now put the variational inequality of Eq. (19) into standard form (Nagurney, 
1993). Define the column vector (X) = (q, e, I, A,p) E R";.0 + mr + 2m,,,+ "' and F(X)
as the row vector that consists of the row vectors (G(X), E(X), L(X), A(X), P(X)), 
where G(X) is the mo-dimensional vector with component ik given by aGJ aq;k -
1rk; E(X) is the mr-dimensional vector with component it given by 
aG; ;, , h' 
--, + i.., A;j ij ile; j=I 
L(X) is the mnr-dimensional vector with component ijt given by pJ - ,\'.j ; A(X) is 
the mnr-dimensional vector with component ijt given by z:j - h'.je:, and P(X) is 
the nr-dimensional vector with jtth component by 
m 
E (l:y - z:j ).
i=I 
The variational inequality of Eq. (19) can now be expressed as follows. De­
termine X* E K, such that 
F(X*) (X-X*) � 0, VXEK (20) 
where K = {(X) = (q, e, I,,\, p) E R'::.o+ mr+ 2mnr+nr}.
We now establish in the following corollary that the equilibrium patte� is 
independent of the initial license allocation, provided that the sum of the licenses 
for each receptor point for each pollutant is fixed. We then discuss what the value 
of that sum should be, given the environmental quality standards. 
Corollary 1. If z:y � 0 for all i = 1, ... , m, j = 1, ... , n and t = 1, ... , r and E;"= 1 
z:J = QJ for j = 1, ... , n and t = 1, ... , r, with each QJ fixed and positive, then the 
equilibrium pattern (q*, e* ,I*,,\*, p*) is independent of {l:J}.
Proof. The first four terms in the variational inequality of Eq. (19) are independent 
of {l:y}, whereas the last term only depends on the sum E;"= 1 z:y for j = 1, ... , n
and t = 1, ... , r. D 
Hence, any initial allocation of licenses that maintains the desired sum of the 
licenses for each receptor point and pollutant will not affect the equilibrium 
pattern. 
We now present a theorem which provides a manner of determining the 
appropriate sums of the initial licenses for each receptor point and pollutant. It is 
an important result for operationalizing this approach. 
Theorem 2. An equilibrium vector achieves environmental quality standards as repre­
sented by the vector (Q1, ••• , Qn ), where Qj = 
(QJ, ... , Q;), provided that E;"= 1 
lfJ = QJ for j = 1, ... , n and t = 1, ... , r.
Proof. From Eq. (11), we have that, for each firm i, i = 1, ... , m, and for each 
pollutant t, t = 1, ... , r, that 
hi '* < [* iiei - ij• Vj = l, ... ,n, Vt= l, ... ,r
Moreover, it follows from the equilibrium conditions of Eq. (18) and from the 
assumption on the initial license allocations that 
m m m 
� ht I* � 11* � [10 _ Qt1... ije; :s;; i... ij :s;; i... ij - j• 
i=1 i=l i= I 
2.4. Qualitative properties 
Vj=l, ... ,n, Vt=l, ... ,r D 
Here, we investigate certain qualitative properties of the equilibrium. In particu­
lar, we establish properties of the function F(X) that are needed for convergence 
of the algorithm in Section 3. 
Lemma 1. If the utility function of Eq. (9) is concave for each firm i, then F(X) is 
monotonic. 
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Lemma 2. The function F(X) is Lipschitz continuous, i.e. there exists a positive 
constant L, such that 
vx1,x2 EK (21) 
under the assumption that the utility functions have bounded second-order derivatives. 
Proof. This follows from the same arguments as the proof of Lemma 3 in Nagurney 
(1993). 
3. The algorithm
Here, we present an algorithm for the solution of the variational inequality of
Eq. (20) - equivalently, Eq. (19) - that governs the multi-product, multi-pollu­
tant market equilibrium model for pollution permits. The algorithm resolves the 
variational inequality problem into very simple subproblems, each of which can be 
solved explicitly and in closed form. 
The algorithm that we propose for the computation of the equilibrium pattern is 
the modified projection method of Korpelevich (1976). The algorithm is guaranteed 
to converge, provided that F satisfies only the monotonicity condition and the 
Lipschitz continuity condition, assuming that a solution exists. 
The statement of the modified projection method is as follows. 
Step 1: Initialization. Set x0 EK. Let /3 = l and let a be a scalar such that 
0 < a< 1/L, where L is the Lipschitz continuity constant (cf. Eq. (21)). 
Step 2: Computation. Compute X f3 by solving the variational inequality subproblem 
[x/3 + aF(xf3-l)T -x13-1r (X-if3) � 0, for all XE K (22) 
Step 3: Adaptation. Compute X f3 by solving the variational inequality subproblem 
[x/3 + aF(X13)T -x/3-lr (X-X13 ) � 0, for all XE K (23) 
Step 4: Convergence verification. If maxi Xf -xf- 1 1 :s; E for all l, with E > 0 (a 
prespecified tolerance), then stop; else, set /3 = /3 + 1, and go to Step 2.
We now discuss the modified projection method more fully. We first recall the 
definition of the projection of x on the closed convex set K with respect to the 
Euclidean norm, we denote this by PK x as 
(24) 
In particular, we note that (cf. Theorem 1.2, Nagumey, 1993) X f3 generated by 
the modified projection method as the solution to the variational inequality 
subproblem of Eq. (22) is actually the projection of X /3- 1 - aF(X /3- 1 )T on the 
closed convex set K, where K here is simply the non-negative orthant. In other 
words, we have 
(25) 
Similarly, X 13 generated by the solution to the variational inequality subproblem 
of Eq. (23) is the projection of x/3- I - aF(if3)T on the non-negative orthant, i.e. 
(26) 
Because the feasible set here is of the box type, the above projections immedi­
ately decompose across the coordinates of the feasible set. In fact, the solution of 
each variable encountered in Eqs. (22) and (23) amounts to projecting on to R+ separately. 
Consequently, we can provide closed-form expressions for the solution of the 
problems of Eqs. (22) and (23). In particular, we have that Eq. (22) can be solved as 
follows. For all firms i, i = 1, ... , m, products k, k = 1, ... o, and pollutants t,
t = 1, ... , r set 
and 
e 1f3 = max O a _ ( [aG;(ef-
1,qf- 1) 
' , aef 
� 1i.113-1h] + e t/3-,)i.., I) I) I 
j=I 
(27) 
(28)
For all firms i, i = l, ... , m, all receptor points j, j = 1, ... , n, and all pollutants t,
t = l, ... , r, set 
i1f3 = max{o a (-p'/3-l + >._1/3-l) + 11/3-l} IJ > } I) I] (29) 
and 
>..'13 = max{o a (-11/3-l + h. etf3-l) + >._1/3-1} 1) > I} I) I I} (30) 
Finally, for all receptor points j, j = 1, ... , n, and all pollutants t, t = l, ... , r,
set 
p]f3=max(o, a (-_i::1:y+ _i::1:1-
1) +py- 1) 
t=I 1= I 
(31) 
The variational inequality subproblem of Eq. (23) can be solved explicitly in 
closed form in a similar manner. 
Convergence is given in the following: 
Theorem 3. The modified projection method described above converges to the solution 
of the variational inequality of Eq. ( 13) under the assumptions that the utility functions 
have bounded second-order derivatives and are concave. 
Proof. It follows from Lemmas 1 and 2 that the function F(X) is both monotonic 
and Lipschitz continuous, under the stated assumptions. Hence, as established in 
Theorem 2 in Korpelevich (1976), the modified projection method is guaranteed to 
converge under these conditions. D 
4. Numerical examples
Here, we present numerical examples that illustrate the model presented in
Section 2, along with the performance of the algorithm presented in Section 3. We 
consider two examples, both of which are quadratic in form. The cost function used 
in these examples is in terms of input prices, outputs, emissions and other 
technological parameters. The algorithm was coded in FORTRAN 77. The system 
used was the IBM SP2. The CPU times below are reported exclusive of input -
output and initialization times. 
&ample l. 
This example consists of five firms and 10 receptor points. Each firm produces 
two outputs and emits two pollutants. Each firm in the permit market faces a joint 
production and emission-abatement cost of the form 
(32) 
where w 1 and w2 represent the prices of the two inputs, and al if , a2;n bl;k, b2;k 
and /; are the technological parameters. The values for these parameters are given 
in Table 1. 
The initial allocation of the licenses for pollutants t, t = l, 2, i.e. the lfJ terms 
were set as follows: lfJ = 0, if i :5: j, for t = l, 2; otherwise, lfJ = St. The diffusion 
matrix H terms, i.e. the h\1 terms were set as follows: hiJ = 0.0001 y, and hf1 = 
0.00057 for pairs i, j.
In this example, we assume that the typical firm produces a higher quantity of 
product 1 and emits a higher amount of pollutant 1. Hence, we initialized the 
algorithm with q;� = 40 and q?2 = 20 for all firms i. Also, the prices charged for 
these products are set at 1r 1 = 30 and 1r2 = 20. Furthermore, because the two 
pollutants emitted would be dissimilar, the initial values for the emissions are set at 
eJ" = 10 and e;
° 
= 5 for all the firms i. All the remaining initial variables are· set 
equal to 1. 
We set a = 0.01 and used e = 0.0001 for the convergence tolerance. 
The algorithm converged in 99 iterations and 0.05 CPU seconds, and yielded the 
equilibrium output vector for product 1 as 
q/ = (13.33, 6.92, 14.16, 10.77, 6.33) 
It gave the equilibrium output vector for product 2 as 
qz* = (5.60,9.21,8.18,4.36, 7.16) 
It gave the equilibrium emission vector for pollutant 1 as 
e 1* = (4.00,2.51,3.33,5.05,4.17)
Table 1 
Example 1 - production and emission cost paramters 
Firm i WI Wz /; al il al;2 a2;1 a2;2 bl;1 bl;2 b2;1 b2 12 
1 5 10 3.2 -2.0 -1.5 0.5 0.8 2.0 3.2 2.1 3.0 
2 5 10 1.1 -1.0 -2.0 0.4 0.6 3.0 2.5 3.9 1.9 
3 5 10 8.0 -2.0 -1.0 0.6 0.7 3.1 2.0 1.9 2.2 
4 5 10 3.9 -1.5 -3.0 0.3 0.8 2.0 3.0 2.6 3.9 
5 5 10 6.0 -2.5 -1.0 0.6 0.5 3.5 2.1 4.0 2.5 
It gave the equilibrium emission vector for pollutant 2 as 
e2* = (1.84, 3.33, 1.43, 3.75, 2.00) 
and it gave the license price vector for both pollutants t = 1, 2 as 
p1* = (0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 3.00, 3.00, 3.00, 3.00, 3.00, 3.00) .
We also computed the maximum error for these terms, where the error is the 
value of the corresponding function term in the variational inequality problem of 
Eq. (19). Specifically, when qik is positive in the equilibrium condition of Eq. (14), 
it follows that 
should be equal to 1rk, i.e. the price for the product k. If this equality does not 
hold, then qik is zero. Similarly, the equilibrium conditions of Eqs. (15)-(18) are 
required to be satisfied. The maximum error for the expressions in the variables of 
the variational inequality problem is 0.0001. We do not report all the license values 
and abatement costs, because there are too many values. 
Example 2 
The second example also consists of five firms, 10 receptor points, two products 
and two pollutants. However, in this example, we include an interaction term in the 
joint production and emission abatement cost. Specifically, this cost function has 
the form 
Gi(ei , qi ) = (w 1 X w2 )
112 [ 'f, cl;,eI + 'f, c2i1(e;/
t= I t= I 
+ r. dlik qik + t d2ik(qik >2]
k=I k=I 
+ (w 1 X w2 )
112 [ 'f, 'f, hl;,h2ik(eiqik )]
t= I k= I 
(33) 
where w 1 and w2 are the prices of the two inputs, and clit, c2it, dlik • d2;k , hliJ, 
h1;2 , h2u and h2;2 are the technological parameters. The values for these parame­
ters are given in Table 2. 
The joint production and emission abatement cost is more general in this 
example, because it includes an additional term that would handle the interaction 
between the output produced and pollutants emitted. 
To analyze a different scenario in this example, we consider firm i as initially 
producing a greater quantity of product 2 and emitting a greater amount of 
Table 2 
Example 2 - production and emission cost parameters 
Firm i W
I 
Wz cl;1 c1;2 c2;1 c2., '" d1 il dl;2 d2il d2;2 hln hl , ,_ h2;1 h2, '" 
1 5 10 -1.0 -2.5 0.2 0.25 2.0 1.5 2.2 1.6 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 
2 5 10 -2.1 -1.6 0.8 0.35 4.0 2.0 3.8 2.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 
3 5 10 -2.0 -3.0 0.3 0.25 2.5 1.5 2.6 1.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 
4 5 10 -1.0 -2.0 0.2 0.50 2.1 3.0 2.0 3.5 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.1 
5 5 10 -2.4 -1.5 0.8 0.15 3.0 1.5 3.5 1.7 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 
pollutant 2. Hence, the initial values for the two products are set as q/li = 20 and 
q;i = 40. Also, the prices charged for the products are set at 1r1 = 25 and 1r2 = 40. 
Furthermore, the emissions are initialized as ef" = 5 and e;
° 
= 10. The rest of the 
data used are identical to these of Example 1. 
The algorithm converged in 325 iterations and 0.17 seconds of CPU times, and 
yielded the equilibrium output vector for product 1 as 
qi* = (5.21, 2.76,4.30, 5.70, 3.13) 
It gave the equilibrium output vector for product 2 as 
qz* = (11.96, 9.01, 15.98, 5.27, 11.29) 
It gave the equilibrium emission vector for pollutant 1 as 
e 1* = (1.65, 1.09, 1.98, 1.68, 1.14) 
It gave the equilibrium emission vector for pollutant 2 as 
e 2* = (4.31, 1.61, 5.60, 1.67, 4.56)
and it gave the license price vector for both pollutants t = l, 2 as 
p 1* = (0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 3.00, 3.00, 3.00, 3.00, 3.00, 3.00).
Again, we do not report the license values and abatement costs, because there 
are too many of them. Moreover, each iteration is remarkably simply and computa­
tionally very efficient, because closed-form expressions are used. 
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we have utilized the theory of variational inequalities for the
formulation, analysis and computation of equilibrium solutions to a market model 
in pollution permits that consists of multi-product, multi-pollutant firms. The 
emissions are spatially differentiated. 
In particular, we first derived the optimality conditions that govern each per­
fectly competitive firm, and then obtained the economic conditions that govern the 
licenses to pollute and the license prices. We also gave an economic interpretation 
to these conditions. All the systems of equalities and inequalities were then shown 
to satisfy a single inequality, i.e. a finite-dimensional variational inequality prob­
lem. 
We then turned to the qualitative analysis of the model and established certain 
properties; in particular, the monotonicity and Lipschitz continuity of the function 
that enters the variational inequality model, under reasonable conditions on the 
cost functions that face each firm. The same conditions are needed to establish the 
convergence of the proposed algorithm, i.e. the modified projection method. In the 
context of our problem, this algorithm resolves what we expect to be a large-scale 
problem into simple subproblems, each of which can be solved simultaneously and 
in closed form. 
We subsequently applied the algorithm to numerical examples to illustrate its 
performance. Further research can entail incorporating other behaviors into the 
model, such as oligopolistic behavior, sensitivity analysis, as well as evaluation of 
alternative policy scenarios. Finally, to aid further in the operationalization of this 
framework, the importance of empirical work cannot be underestimated. 
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Appendix A 
Al. Proof of Theorem 1 
Assume that (q*, e*, I*, >..*, p*) E Rmo + mr + 2mnr + "' is an equilibrium. Note that Eq. 
(13) thus holds for all firms i = 1, ... , m, and that, summing it over all firms, one obtains
m r 
[
aG(e* *) II 
] +" " ; ; ,q; + "Jt..1.*h1 - (e' - e'*) /..,,, /..,,, t � lj lj l I i= 1 r= 1 ae; i= 1 
m 11 r 
+ E E E (pJ* - A'.j) (t!j - l!j)
i= I j= It= I 
m n r 
+ E E E (t!j - h'.je!*) ( AL + A'.j) � 0,
i= I j= It= I 
V(q, e, l, ).) E R'':o+mr+ 2m11r. (Al) 
Also, from the system of Eq. (18), we can conclude that the equilibrium must satisfy 
11 r m 
E E E (t!Y- t!j)(pJ - pJ*) � o,
j= It= Ii= I 
Vp ER!'. 
Indeed, note that, if pJ* > 0, then Eq. (18) gives that 
m 
� (1
10 
- l'*) = 0L.J lj I) 
i= I 
and Eq. (A2) must hold. However, if pJ* = 0, then Eq. (18) gives that 
m 
� (t'
0 
- l'*) > 0 i.., I} I} -
i= I 
and Eq. (A2) must hold. 
(A2) 
Finally, summing Eqs. (Al) and (A2), one obtains the variational inequality of Eq. (19). 
We now establish the converse of the proof, i.e. that the solution to Eq. (19) also satisfies 
Eqs. (13) and (18). Let (q*, e*, l*, ).*, p*) E Rmo + mr + lmnr + '" be a solution of Eq. (19). If 
one lets qfk = qfl for all i, k; e/ = e/* for all i; l/j = l/j for all i, j, t; A}i = A}j, for all i, j, 
t; and substitutes these values into Eq. (19), one obtains 
n r m 
E E E (1;y-1; )(PJ - pJ*) � o,
j= It= Ii= I 
Vp ER!' 
which implies the system conditions of Eq. (18). 
(A3) 
Similarly, if one lets pJ = pJ* for j, t, and substitutes these values into Eq. (19), then one 
obtains 
+ � � ' 
''' 
+ � A'-*h'- (e' -e'*)
m r 
[ 
iJG.(e* q*) n 
] 
£.J ,i...., I ,i...., I) lj I I 
i=l t=I iJe; j=I 
m fl r 
+ E E E (pJ* - A'.j )(t/j - t;j)
i= I j= It= I 
m II r 
+ L L L (tlj - h\/!* ){ A'.j - A'.j) � 0,
i= I j= It= I 
'fl(q,e,l, ).) E R":.o+mr+2m11r (A4) 
which implies that Eq. (13) must hold for the firms. D 
A2. Proof of Lemma 1 
We will establish that F(X) is monotone, i.e. 
[F(X 1 ) - F(X2 )] (X 1 - X2 ):.::; 0, 'v'X 1 ,X2 EK 
In view of the definition of F(X) in the above model, Eq. (25) takes the form 
(A5) 
+ ; >/
2
h'··]) (e'I - e'
2 ) i..J l) I) l I 
j= I 
m n r 
+ E E E [(PJ' - A:}) -(P;2 -A:;)] (t;J - t;J)
i= I j= It= I 
m n r 
+ E E E [ ( if) -h;je: 1 } -(t;J -h'./: 2)] ( A;J - A:}) 
i= I j= It= 1 
11 r m 
+ L L L [(1:y -ll)) - (t/Y -1:J)] (P;1 - P;2). 
j= It= Ii= I 
After combining and simplifying terms, Eq. (A6) reduces to 
;., � 
[ 
aG;(e/, q/) aG;(el, q?)] 1 2 
1.., 1.., ----- - (qik - qik) 
i=, k=, aq;k aq;k 
;., � 
[
iJG;(e/, q;') _ iJG;(e;2, q?)] 11 _ ,2 + 1.., 1.., t 1 (e; C; ). 
i= I r= I iJe; iJe; 
(A6) 
(A7) 
However, under the assumption that the utility functions are concave, we know that 
minus the gradient of the utility function is monotone; hence, the expression in Eq. (A 7) 
must be greater than or equal to zero. o 
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